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Editors’ Introduction
In this issue, we are pleased to offer the third of
three parts of a major work by Elias Capriles offering a
reframing of transpersonal theory from the perspective
of Dzogchen Buddhism. His response to the field focuses
specifically on critiques of the theories of Ken Wilber,
Stan Grof, and Michael Washburn. In the course of
expounding Dzogchen doctrines and explicating these
critiques of leading transpersonal theorists, Capriles
touches on a rich array of philosophical and psychological
topics. As a practitioner of Dzogchen for more than
thirty years, he brings both the articulate mind of a
scholar and the experienced voice of a practitioner to his
subject.
Although Capriles’ words would be different,
the thrust of his paper might be summarized something
like this: Transpersonal psychology is valuable because
it acknowledges and studies self-healing states of mind
not recognized by standard psychology. As such, it is
able to counter the tendency to pathologize spiritual
and transpersonal experiences. In this way, the field may
provide important support and context for individuals
undergoing such experiences, and perhaps save them
from unnecessary and therefore possibly detrimental
psychiatric treatment. While transpersonal psychology
thus has recognized the existence of higher and holotropic
states of awareness, it is not yet able to discriminate
adequately between the many different variations of
such states. This leads to a number of problems. Perhaps
the most vexing of these is that theorists within the field
tend to misidentify as nirvana states that do not at all
correspond with the characteristics of true Awakening.
This does not invalidate transpersonal theories, but it
does suggest that the works of major theorists such as
Wilber, Grof, and Washburn should be reconsidered in
this light.

From the perspective of Dzogchen Buddhism,
which Capriles sees as the highest vehicle within
Buddhism and the most direct path to Awakening,
Wilber’s model is the most problematic. Wilber,
according to Capriles, misunderstands Awakening as
a stage-like process in which a subject moves beyond
conventional levels of development, when in fact it is a
spontaneous unveiling of supreme reality in which the
separate subject no longer exists. This Awakening is not
the product of a process and therefore, when it occurs, it
does so without reference to any stage-like developmental
schema. Even if Wilber’s model is compared with the
levels of realization in known Paths of Awakening,
which represent something quite different than a process
of development as ordinarily conceived, the stages that
Wilber proposed have no correspondence in content or
sequence with those levels.
From the perspective of Western psychology,
Wilber’s effort to distill a variety of paths into a single
model can be seen as a reasonable goal. Capriles
concludes that what his visionary approach misses,
however, is the great diversity that actually exists among
different paths. For example, the state of samadhi sought
by practitioners of Yoga results in a deep absorption in
which active knowing and awareness of the sensory
continuum cease. One is no longer able to function
practically in the world. By contrast, both sensory
and cognitive processes continue in nirvana, and the
practitioner is not only able to function, but does so
in enhanced ways. What differs is that the distinctions
between subject and object, knower and known, have
been absolutely eradicated. In a nirvanic state, there is
not a subject who experiences nirvana: there is simply
the arising of apparent yet transparent phenomena
within the presence of supreme reality. Furthermore,
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rather than bypassing the realm of ordinary sensory
appearances, nirvana offers the opportunity for skillful
and compassionate engagement with the suffering of the
world. Given the vast difference between these spiritual
goals—which are just two of many such different
goals—any effort to synthesize them will necessarily be
unsuccessful.
Capriles argues that, if Wilber’s framework
is deconstructed in this way, then concepts that rely
on this framework should also be re-examined. For
example, in light of a Dzogchen view of Awakening,
neither the notion of a pre / trans fallacy, nor the debate
over whether spiritual development is an ascending
or descending process, has significance. Awakening,
from Capriles’ perspective, is the unraveling of the very
context within which pre / trans and ascent / descent
derive meaning. For all of these reasons, he argues that
is difficult to conclude that the conceptual structure
developed by Wilber has any meaningful application
other than as a testament to one man’s eloquent, but
ultimately flawed, effort to wrest simple truth out of a
complex world.
Grof ’s work, on the other hand, needs to be
considered differently, according to Capriles. Grof ’s
concept of systems of condensed experience, or COEX
systems, suggests that clusters of emotionally relevant
memories are stored together, constituting the deep
woundings that distort personality and behavior, and
that these clusters may be accessed and deep self-healing
processes triggered through the therapeutic use of LSD
or the practice of intense breathing techniques. Capriles
agrees that such an idea might well find a place within
a more inclusive psychology that seeks to trigger deep,
self-healing processes. However, Capriles thinks it is
crucial to distinguish between these intense self-healing
states that Grof called holotropic states—or states
tending toward wholeness—and the nirvanic states
of Awakening. For example, one type of holotropic
experience involves states in which the individual has
an experience of connectedness, even of identity, with
immeasurably larger aspects of life. While this is a type
of peak experience, it is not Awakening for the simple
reason that there is still a subject who feels at one, and
an object—a cosmos—with which that subject feels
connected and identified. The disparity between such
states and nirvana can be highlighted by considering the
other type of holotropic experience: those that involve
terror, despair, guilt, or other types of extreme emotional
suffering. These states involve great discomfiture precisely
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because the mental subject has not dissolved. Since such
experiences are seen by Grof as on a continuum with
experiences of cosmic oneness, Capriles concludes that
none of these states constitutes nirvana.
In addition, Capriles points out that Grof made
no proper distinction between states obtained through the
use of psychedelic substances and those gained through
effective spiritual practice. As such, he implied that
such drugs may promote genuine spiritual development.
However, Capriles asserts that the use of such chemicals
brings the user no closer to Awakening, and carries the
risk of producing dangerous psychotic states. A similar
issue pertains to Grof’s work on the study of spiritual
emergence and spiritual emergency. Capriles recognizes
that this valuable initiative can provide much-needed
support for individuals immersed in crises, increasing
their chances of emerging more whole from the difficult
passage; however, he rejects that such episodes are markers
on a path leading to Awakening. Capriles’ consistent issue
with Grof’s work, then, is that holotropic states, druginduced psychotic experiences, and mental crises arising
from a variety of sources are not adequately identified
by Grof as processes that happen entirely within the
conditioned mind. Capriles emphasizes that, although
some of these may be beneficial for promoting valuable
self-healing, self-healing should be clearly delineated as a
process that is wholly distinct from Awakening.
Capriles acknowledges that Washburn’s model
is intuitively closer to Buddhist concepts in that the
spiritual journey is not seen as a path of development,
but instead one in which the ego returns to the Ground
from which it arose, and from which it has become
estranged. Furthermore, Washburn seems to trace a
quite genuine process of inner integration in which
mind and body are reunited in a new and higher form of
psychic organization, and finally he does not claim that
this process leads to Awakening and admits that it only
rarely leads to mystical illumination. Capriles concludes
that all of this makes Washburn’s theoretical structure
more humble and more transparent in its claims. But,
from Capriles’ Dzogchen perspective, Washburn’s major
shortfall is not in what he admits within his theories,
but in what he excludes. Because Washburn frames
engagement with spirituality as a journey that begins
with the nascent ego of the infant, and ends with an ego
that has become an instrument of the Ground, Capriles
concludes this implies that the goal and aim of human
spirituality pertains entirely to the domain of the ego.
This position effectively excludes the Path of Awakening,
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in which the ego is seen as not merely brought to heel,
but utterly eradicated. As such, Capriles sees Washburn’s
system not as inaccurate in its content, but distorted by
its limited context.
In a similar sense, Capriles concludes that
Washburn falls prey to the common transpersonal
tendency to oversimplify spiritual processes and rejects
Washburn’s suggestion that all forms of meditation
may be usefully classified within just two categories—
receptive meditation and concentrative meditation. This
is because, for example, one practice of what might be
called receptive meditation may have as its goal something
radically different than other practices included in the
same category, and might in fact even be more closely
related in terms of its goal to some concentrative practices
than to other receptive practices. For this reason, the
simple distinction between receptivity and concentration
may be no more helpful for distinguishing between the
many forms of meditation than classifying people by
whether their navels go in or out.
In his critiques of Wilber, Grof, and Washburn,
Capriles writes as a traditionalist, and the Dzogchen
teachings of his lineage—passed to him through
Chögyal Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche—serve as the
unwavering reference point for his engagement with
the transpersonal field. He presents his perspective as
metatranspersonal because he considers the doctrines and
practices of Dzogchen as belonging to an entirely higher
level than transpersonal theory. He holds Dzogchen as
a path that leads to true Awakening into the perfectly
nondual states of nirvana, while he sees transpersonal
theories as generally reflecting experiences that do not
reach above the higher levels of samsara, the states of the
relative and conditioned mind.
In the spirit of a traditionalist, Capriles’ thread
of criticism closely follows the contours of Dzogchen
doctrine. Those aspects of theory that are consistent with
Dzogchen are praised, those that conflict are denounced,
and the positions of Dzogchen are frequently reasserted.
Yet the discussion flows into numerous fascinating and
highly-informative digressions that, together with the
central critical engagement with transpersonal theorists,
challenge the transpersonal project in refreshing and
stimulating ways.
The topics engaged in this paper are complex,
and Capriles’ voice as a detail-focused non-native English
speaker has its own particular flavor that cannot easily be
divorced from its core content. For these reasons, certain
idiosyncracies and deviations from the standard APA

style of the journal have been allowed and there has been
minimal editorial input on anything other than some
modest attempts at standardization. We consequently
recognize this piece, and the previous pieces written
by Capriles in this journal, as likely difficult to read.
However, we think it presents an important substantive
challenge to much of contemporary transpersonal
studies and hope readers will find this both edifying
and thought provoking. As editors, we ourselves have at
times struggled with understanding some of it intricacies,
and do not claim to fully comprehend all contained
within, but we unwaveringly conclude that it was a
struggle well worthwhile. In this sense, sometimes one
reads a paper and is left with more of an intuitive sense
of its importance, despite not being able to rationally
assimilate and accommodate its entirety: such is this
work by Capriles.
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